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CURRENT LEGISLATION
and unconditional only in the case of our neighbors. It does not
seem to me that any one who has satisfied himself that an act of his
was wrong, and that he will never do it again, would feel the least
need or propriety, as between himself and an earthly punishing power
alone, of his being made to suffer for what he had done, although,
when third persons were introduced, he might, as a philosopher,
admit the necessity of hurting him to frighten others. But when our
neighbors do wrong, we sometimes feel the fitness of making them
smart for it, whether they have repented or not. The feeling of fitness seems to me to be only vengeance in disguise, and I have already
admitted that vengeance was an element, though not the chief element
of punishment." Nevertheless, it may be assumed as a postulate of
sound legal philosophy that the excellence of the criminal law is
directly proportional to the extent to which it abandons vengeance as
a criterion and adopts prevention and reform as the essential basis
for dealing with crimes and criminals.
It is difficult to say how this can be accomplished without the
complete individualization of the treatment of criminals. For if the
truth were known, it should probably be found that every member of
every gang, no matter how closely affiliated with his colleagues, was
nevertheless an individual distinct and apart from the other members
of the gang, and for whose emancipation from the life of crime, an
individual study aiid treatment was necessary. The theory of modem education wghich is based on factual studies leaves that impression
with regard to the non-criminal portions of our society. In the
absence of data it is, of course, not safe to assume anything. But
the chief lesson, here as elsewhere, is that uninformed legislation
cannot be expected to be significantly corrective. 5
VERNON F.

MURPHY.

FILING OF CONTRACTS OF CONDITIONAL SALES IN NEW YORK.-

Legislation which has for its goal the clarification of enactments
which have to do with the filing of conditional sales contracts cannot
fail to be of value. A study of existing laws reveals solely confusion
and contradiction. The new bill promises relief to a branch of the
law in which succor is sadly needed.
The bill in substance provides that the filing of conditional sales
contracts, provided for in Sections 65, 66, and 67 "of this Article"
shall be valid for a period of three (3) years only, "except that, in
the counties embraced in the city of New York, such filing shall be
valid for one (1) year only." We must look to the history of
conditional sales contracts to appreciate and comprehend the necessity
for such an amendment.
Under the common law in New York, as in many other states,
it was settled that a conditional vendor of goods retained title as
'Cf. Lawes, Crime and Rehabilitation, New York State Bar Assn. Bull.,
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against all the world, albeit to the prejudice of bona fide purchasers
for value, who bought, relying solely upon the apparent title of the
'seller.1 Obviously, such a rule of law, archaic as it seems today, was
the source of much hardship. Purchasers for value were at a loss
to determine when their title would be good. To counteract such
uncertainty, recording acts have been passed in many states.2 The
recording acts throw the onus on the vendor by requiring him to file
a copy of the conditional sales contract in an office of public records
so that the world may have notice of the reservation of his title.
Consequently, today, under the recording acts, such conditional sale
contracts, unless filed, are void as against bona fide purchasers from
the vendee, who take without actual notice of the reservation of title
of the original vendor.a
In New York, while the necessity for filing to retain title is
undoubtedly settled, the question of when and how often, under the4
existing law, such contracts should be refiled still is an open one.
The Legislature, in its zeal to clarify, has effected contradiction. A
brief survey exposes the confusion which prevails in this field of the
law where certainty is so desirable.
Prior to September 1, 1922, conditional sale contracts were
treated in Article 4 of the Personal Property Law, which comprise
Sections 60-67, inclusive. Filing was governed by Section 64, which
provided, in substance, that the contract, to be valid against all bona
fide purchasers or creditors, must have been refiled upon the expiration of the first or any succeeding year "reckoning from the time of
the first filing." This article was repealed by Chapter 642 of the
Laws of 1922, which enacted a new Article 4, comprising Sections
60-80-j, inclusive. Section 71 of the laws as enacted provides:
"The filing of conditional sale contracts * * * shall be
valid for a period of three (3) years only. Refiling, to be
effective, must precede the three-year period thirty (30) days."
Inasmuch as Article 4 of Chapter 642 of the Laws of 1922 ostensibly had repealed all the sections of old Article 4, it appeared that
filing would be good for three (3) years throughout the entire state.
Apparently, the Legislature, however, intended to continue the then
existing "official method of filing" in the counties within the city of
New York, for the last section of this act contains Section 80-j,
which reads:
'Ballard v. Burgett, 40 N. Y. 314 (1869); Austin v. Dye, 46 N. Y. 500
(1871); Comer v. Cunningham, 77 N. Y. 391 (1879).
'New York Statutes, Laws 1897, Ch. 418; Laws 1884, Ch. 315.
'Kirk v. Crystal, 118 App. Div. 32, 103 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1st Dept. 1907);
aff'd in 193 N. Y. 622, 86 N. E. 1126 (1908).
'Whitney on Sales (1929), Sec. 52.
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"Nothing in this article contained shall be deemed to
affect the provisions of Section 64 of the personal property
law, or any other provision of law regulating or relating to the
official method of filing, refiling, indicing, canceling or satisfying contracts of conditional sale filed in any of the counties
within the city of New York or the fees payable therefor."
It appears that the sole effect intended by Section 80-j was to
retain the "method of filing, refiling, indicing, canceling or satisfying
contracts" in New York City and was not intended to modify the
provisions of Section 71, above referred to.
But, on April 9, 1925, the Legislature, oblivious to the confusion
that would follow, enacted Chapter 561 of the Laws of 1925, which,
so far as pertinent to the present discussion, reads as follows:
"Section 1. Section 64 of Chapter 45 of the Laws of
1909, entitled 'An Act Relating to Personal Property,' being
Chapter 41 of the consolidated laws as last amended by Chapter 455 of the Laws of 1915, and continued in force and
effect by Chapter 642 of the Laws of 1922, is hereby amended
to read as follows: 'Section 64. Indorsement, entry, refiling
and discharge of conditional sale contracts (then follows a
restatement of the old Section 64 verbatim except for a minor
change).'"
The result is that the old Section 64, in effect prior to 1922, was
revivified in its entirety, including the provision for refiling every
year, while Section 71, providing for refiling every three years, continues to remain in force.
The enigma fostered by such careless legislation is aptly illustrated by two recent decisions, wherein two judges, in construing the
same sections of this law reached contradictory conclusions. Judge
Valente, in his opinion, 5 felt that Section 71 as to filing was the law
of the entire state. To quote him:
"If the Legislature had intended to restrict Section 71 to
the territory outside of New York City, it would have said so.
What is more likely is that, after Section 64 was repealed by
Chapter 642 of the Laws of 1922, it was discovered that the
provisions for the routine method of filing, including, etc., in
New York City had been omitted. Section 64 was therefore
continued in force by Section 80-j to the extent of preserving
Perfect Lighting Fixtures Co., Inc. v. Grubar Realty Corp., New York
Law Journal. Nov. 2, 1929, at 605. Affrlned on appeal: "We are of the opinion
that, had the Legislature intended that Section 71 (added by Laws of 1922, Ch.
642, as amended by Laws of 1926, Ch. 160) be applicable only to counties
outside those within the city of New York, the statute would have clearly so
stated." 228 App. Div. 141 at 144 (1st Dept. 1930).
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such former methods of filing, indicing, etc. Such a method
of preservation seemed unsatisfactory, and old Section 64 was
therefore expressly restored in 1925 in its present form. This
restoration, however, did not serve as an amendment to Section 71 or as introducing a one-year period in New York City."
On the other hand, Judge Noonan in his opinion 6 felt that
Section 71 was restricted in its application to counties outside of New
York City by virtue of the Laws of 1925 which revived the old Section 64, and that it was necessary in the counties of New York City
for the vendor to refile at the expiration of the first year.
From this labyrinth of confusion the new bill introduced promises much-needed relief. Aside from the fact that it would definitely
settle the time necessary for refiling in the counties of New York
City, it expedites the work of the frequently overburdened lawyer.
Lawyers who have been called upon -to search back three years for
copies of conditional sales contracts on file in the register's office, can
appreciate the benefits that would accrue if the new bill introducednecessitating refiling in New York City at the expiration of one year
-were .to becom law. The Legislature, in distinguishing between
the counties of New York City and the rest of the state as to the time
of refiling, perforce must have realized that the simplification of
searches was to be desired in the densely populated counties of New
York City. We cannot help but agree that a law which requires
searches of the records for one year instead of three will save much
time and effort to the busy lawyer, to whom time is usually of the
essence.
JOSEPH A. SCHIAVONE.

QUALIFICATION OF AN ATTORNEY AS A COMPETENT WITNESS IN
PROBATE PROCEEDINGS.-In order to foster and protect the relation-

ship of attorney and client, the rule was established early in the common law, that confidential communications between attorney and
client are privileged.
"In ancient times, parties litigant were in the habit of
coming into court, and prosecuting or defending their suits, in
person. Subsequently, however, as law-suits multiplied, and
modes of judicial proceeding became more complex and formal, it became necessary to have these suits conducted by persons skilled in the law and in the practice of the courts. This
necessity gave rise, at an early day, to the class of attorneys;
to facilitate the business of the courts, it was important that
these men should be employed. But as parties were not then
obliged to testify in their own cases, and could not be compelled
Gimbel Bros. v. Brown, New York Law Journal, June 12, 1929 at 1301.

